VRF over IPsec-Protected GRE: The Tunnel That Never Comes Up
Two sites should share a VRF over an encrypted GRE tunnel, and the tunnel will not even come up. Fix it on four real routers, right below.
Symptom
Two sites share a customer VRF over an encrypted GRE tunnel, and site A cannot reach site B at all. Find both faults on four real routers and prove the traffic is encrypted.
Your mission
Prove the cause, then fix it
Format
Four real routers
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Lab debrief
Turn the session into a repeatable troubleshooting pattern.
Use this reference after your attempt: first explain the symptom, then verify the evidence, then confirm the repair.
The problem
Site A (R1) and site B (R4) share a private customer network, VRF CUST, over a GRE tunnel between their loopbacks, protected by IPsec, across a two-router core running OSPF. The customer networks must never appear in the global routing table. Today R1's tunnel interface will not come up, and the sites cannot reach each other.
What you'll practice
- Tell the VRF a tunnel carries apart from the table it uses to reach its destination
- Read IKE states to find where a negotiation stops
- Prove with IPsec counters that traffic is encrypted, not just delivered
- Confirm that customer routes stay out of the global routing table
- Show the VPN surviving a core link failure
1. vrf forwarding and tunnel vrf
vrf forwarding on a tunnel interface puts its inside traffic in a VRF. tunnel vrf sets where the tunnel source and destination are looked up, which only belongs in designs whose underlay is itself in a VRF.
2. IKE main mode
Main mode exchanges proposals, then keys, then authenticates. With mismatched pre-shared keys the two sides derive different keys and stall at the key exchange.
3. Tunnel protection
An IPsec profile applied as tunnel protection encrypts everything the GRE tunnel carries. Without it the tunnel still works, in clear text.
4. Underlay redundancy
The tunnel runs between loopbacks, so any path the underlay finds to the far loopback carries it. A core failure only needs the underlay to reroute.
The topology
Four real routers. R1 (site A) and R4 (site B) each hold VRF CUST with a customer loopback and a GRE tunnel to each other between their loopbacks 1.1.1.1 and 4.4.4.4. R2 and R3 form the core. OSPF runs in the global table on every link.
Commands to run yourself
The real diagnostic commands for this lab, copy-paste ready. Run these in the same order to reproduce the investigation on your own session.
show ip interface brief | include Tunnel0show crypto isakmp sashow crypto ipsec sa | include encaps|decapsping vrf CUST 10.44.44.4 source Loopback10Rate this lab
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Frequently asked
Are these real routers or a simulation?
Real routers. Pressing Start boots four routers just for you, with full command sets: any valid command works, not only the ones the guide suggests. The first start can take a minute or two while the lab server wakes up.
Who can run this lab?
It is included with the Exam Pass and the Year Pass. Each session lasts up to three hours, and you can run one live lab at a time.
Does my exact fix have to match the answer?
No. The lab checks the routers' state: the tunnel's status, a ping inside the VRF, the IPsec counters, the global routing table and the underlay path. Removing the tunnel protection makes the ping work but leaves nothing encrypted, so it does not pass.
Which ENCOR topics does it cover?
Virtualization from section 2.0 of the 350-401 blueprint: VRF, and GRE and IPsec tunneling.
Ready to run this lab yourself?
No setup, no image sourcing. Book a session or ask for a live demo.