Control Plane Policing: The Policy That Cut R1 Off
A control plane policy meant to drop one subnet has cut R1 off from its OSPF neighbors. Fix it without weakening it on four real routers, right below.
Symptom
A new control plane policy was meant to drop one quarantine subnet. Since it went on, R1 has no OSPF neighbors. Fix it on four real routers without weakening it.
Your mission
Prove the cause, then fix it
Format
Four real routers
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Lab debrief
Turn the session into a repeatable troubleshooting pattern.
Use this reference after your attempt: first explain the symptom, then verify the evidence, then confirm the repair.
The problem
R1's new control plane policy has four classes: drop anything from the quarantine subnet 10.99.0.0/16, pass OSPF, rate-limit ICMP, and police everything else. Since it was applied, R1 has no OSPF neighbors and nothing can reach it. The policy must stay, and the quarantine must still hold once R1 is back.
What you'll practice
- Read show policy-map control-plane to see which class each packet lands in
- Explain how a wildcard mask changes what an ACL entry matches
- Fix a drop class without removing the protection it provides
- Prove a quarantined source is still dropped and a trusted one is not
- Watch a police action drop a ping flood while routing stays up
1. Classes are checked in order
A packet lands in the first class whose match it meets. A drop class placed first takes anything its ACL matches, whatever later classes were meant for.
2. Wildcard masks
A wildcard bit set to 1 means that address bit is ignored. IOS stores an entry with the ignored bits zeroed, so a mismatched address and wildcard shows up in show ip access-lists.
3. No drop in class-default
IOS does not accept a plain drop action in class-default; police it at a low rate instead.
4. Policing
A police action passes traffic up to a rate and drops the rest, counting both. That is how a flood is limited without blocking the protocol entirely.
The topology
Four real routers running OSPF area 0 on every link. R1 is the protected router, with loopback 1.1.1.1 and links to R2 and R3. R4 is a monitoring router with loopback 4.4.4.4 and a second loopback, 10.99.0.4, in the quarantine subnet.
Commands to run yourself
The real diagnostic commands for this lab, copy-paste ready. Run these in the same order to reproduce the investigation on your own session.
show ip ospf neighborshow policy-map control-planeshow ip access-listsping 1.1.1.1 source Loopback99Rate this lab
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Frequently asked
Are these real routers or a simulation?
Real routers. Pressing Start boots four routers just for you, with full command sets: any valid command works, not only the ones the guide suggests. The first start can take a minute or two while the lab server wakes up.
Who can run this lab?
It is included with the Exam Pass and the Year Pass. Each session lasts up to three hours, and you can run one live lab at a time.
Does my exact fix have to match the answer?
No. The lab checks the routers' state: R1's OSPF neighbors, which of R4's sources can reach R1, and the ICMP class counters. Removing the policy or emptying its ACL brings OSPF back but lets the quarantine through, so those do not pass.
Which ENCOR topics does it cover?
Infrastructure security from section 5.0 of the 350-401 blueprint: ACLs and control plane policing.
Ready to run this lab yourself?
No setup, no image sourcing. Book a session or ask for a live demo.